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The Netherlands East Indies, the vast Dutch colony, was invaded by the Japanese 
and occupied with relative ease. The Indies government surrendered on March 8,1942. 
In the days leading up to the surrender, on orders of the Dutch Governor General, a 
number of government officials left for Australia. The Dutch government in exile in 
London—Germany occupied the Netherlands from May 1940—authorized the 
formation of an Indies government in exile in Australia, named the Netherlands Indies 
Commission. The commission was inaugurated on April 8, 1942, and was headed by H. 
J. van Mook. Starting in April 1944, the Raad van Departementshoofden (Commission 
of Departmental Heads) acted as Van Mook's cabinet. It consisted of six members, with 
Loekman Djajadiningrat as the sole Indonesian among them. Matters regarding the 
Dutch and Indonesians in Australia were supervised by Ch. O. van der Plas, who held 
the rank of Chief Commissioner for Australia and New Zealand and who was 
undoubtedly the most influential member of the Raad.
The Indonesians stranded in Australia beginning in March 1942—mostly seamen 
and soldiers—cost Van der Plas a lot of time and caused him much worry. Moreover,
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he was also responsible for the almost forgotten community of political prisoners, 
interned in Boven Digoel, in the Southeast New Guinea jungle. That part of the 
Netherlands Indies was all that was left of the Dutch realm. But the area was 
threatened, and for that reason Van der Plas organized an evacuation of Digoel 
internees to Australia in March 1943. The influx of some five hundred Indonesians was 
to cause a lot of work for Dutch and Australian officials. But the unconventional Van 
der Plas also seized the opportunity to employ former exiles for anti-Japanese 
propaganda activities within the Netherlands Indies Government Information Service 
(NIGIS). He went even further by endorsing, or perhaps even stimulating, the 
establishment of Serikat Indonesia Baroe (SIBAR, Association for a New Indonesia), an 
organization intended to become in the post-war Indies a national party, with official 
Dutch backing. He consciously sought the support of the exiles, many of whom were 
communists, to promote SIBAR. For these communists, cooperation fitted in with the 
Allied struggle against fascism, even if this involved siding with a colonial power. 
Examples of such cooperation are also to be found in Vietnam, Malaya, and the 
Philippines, but none went as far as the Dutch partnership offer, and nowhere else was 
a colonial government more deeply involved with communist leaders as was the Indies 
Commission in Australia. This qualitative difference distinguishes SIBAR from other 
colonial-communist wartime cooperation endeavors, and justifies the designation 
"strange alliance."
Boven Digoel
In 1927, the Dutch colonial government founded its internment camp, Boven 
Digoel, which comprised settlements named Tanah Merah and Tanah Tinggi, deep in 
the inhospitable jungle of New Guinea, three days by ship up the Digoel River. The 
Governor General of the Netherlands Indies could use his discretionary powers, 
granted to him under article 37 of the Indische Staatsregeling (Indies Constitution), to 
send a person considered a threat to law and order to a designated place in the 
Netherlands Indies, from which place the person was not allowed to leave. The term of 
detention was for an indefinite period, and only the Governor General could lift the 
detention. He was not required to justify his decision in each case.
The direct reason to develop Boven Digoel was the communist insurrection of 
1926-27, which surprised and shocked the colonial government and colonial society. 
Mass arrests followed, and no fewer than thirteen thousand people were placed in 
custody initially. To start judicial procedures against such an enormous number of 
people was, of course, beyond the capacity of the courts. Moreover, the majority of 
those jailed could hardly be prosecuted under the existing criminal law, despite the 
presence of a number of broadly worded clauses. Nonetheless, about forty-five 
hundred individuals were processed, convicted, and sent to jail. Of the eighty-five 
hundred others, the vast majority were released. About a thousand were considered an 
enduring threat, and for them the Governor General's "Exorbitante Rechten" 
(Exorbitant Rights) and Boven Digoel provided an effective way to remove these 
"enemies" from society. Most of the exiles were left in Boven Digoel to languish for 
years. Over the years more than half of the first consignment was released, but the 
ranks swelled again with new exiles when the nationalist parties took over from the 
communists after 1927, and in due time also became victims of repression. Among
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them were the leaders of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI Baroe, Indonesian 
National Education). In this way Mohammad Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir made their 
involuntary trip to Digoel. After a year they were transferred to the Banda Islands. 
Digoel's hardships were considered too much for these intellectuals, but this concern 
did not apply to their seventeen co-leaders, who were to stay there until 1943. New 
additions came from the West Sumatran Islam-Nationalist groups Persatoean Muslim 
Indonesia (Permi, Indonesian Muslim Union) and Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII, 
Indonesian Islamic Union Party). A secret attempt to reestablish Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) in 1935 resulted in an inflow of new 
exiles. During the 1930s, almost thirty supporters of the Partai Republik Indonesia 
(Pari), secretly founded in 1927 to establish an underground network in Indonesia, 
were apprehended and sent to Digoel. Pari was the brainchild of Tan Malaka, who 
worked for the Communist International until 1927. He opposed the insurrection of 
1926-27 as doomed to failure. A bitter intra-PKI conflict followed, but the proponents 
of insurrection won the day. For the subsequent defeat Tan Malaka was blamed, and 
Moscow followed suit in denouncing him, motivated in not a minor way by the Stalin- 
Trotsky feud then reaching its climax. A disillusioned Tan Malaka then founded Pari, 
which set an independent communist course, free of the Soviet center. In Digoel, PKI 
and Pari supporters had all the time to discuss the controversies, and they did—but 
they never achieved agreement.
The Dutch authorities emphasized that Digoel was neither a prison nor a 
concentration camp. It was a location that the inmates were not allowed to leave. They 
were free to bring their families to Digoel, and to organize their lives to their own 
liking. The Dutch supplied public amenities such as schools, a hospital, a mosque, and 
two churches. Outsiders could settle in Digoel as well and start a shop, as some 
Chinese did. A hundred soldiers of the colonial army KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlandsch 
Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) kept guard, and KNIL officers were in 
command of the camp.
The exiles were divided into a number of categories. Those who refused to 
cooperate and agitated against the Dutch were labeled intransigents, and for them 
Tanah Tinggi was founded, forty more kilometers upriver. These exiles were also 
called "naturalists," as they received only monthly rations in kind, in natura, hence 
their name. They were left to fend for themselves; their poor rations had to be 
supplemented by tending gardens and fishing. These intransigents were left to 
themselves, not even clothing was supplied, and only the barest of news from the 
outside world reached them. There was ample time for discussion, and, in the intense 
boredom and solitude of their hopeless prospects, political disagreements were blown 
up to become bitter feuds. Mental problems became common, and tropical illnesses, 
especially malaria, were rampant. At the beginning of 1937, sixty-five exiles lived in 
Tanah Tinggi together with sixteen wives and children. At the end of that year, only 
around twenty exiles were accounted for, with no information on any wives or 
children. In 1943, twenty-one exiles were registered in Tanah Tinggi.
The other exiles lived in Tanah Merah. There were also naturalists among them, 
exiles who refused to work but were not considered as intransigent as were the Tanah 
Tinggi dwellers. In Tanah Merah, exiles willing to be employed by the Dutch were
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Indonesians in Australia before August 1945
Name
Abdoelrachman Atmosoediredjo
Almassawa, Sayid Abdurrahman
Boerhanoedin
Bondan, Mohamad
Ditawilastra
Djajadiredja
Djokosoedjono
Djoni, Moh.
Doelrachman
Harjono
Haroen Al-Rasjid 
Kalalo, Pieter 
Limahelu
Loekman Djajadiningrat (died 1943) 
Ma'moen A1 Rasjid Koesoemadilaga 
Maskoen Soemadiredja 
Moechlis, Hadji (or Hadji Moechlas) 
Moenandar 
Moerad, T.A.
Moerwoto 
Nasoetion, Jahja 
Nelwan, M.
Ngadiman 
Noerhadi 
Pande Iroot, Willi 
Patty, A.J.
Poedj osoebroto 
Roekmanda 
Runtulalo, E.
Sabariman
Salim, Abdoel Chalid 
Sardjono
Senan, Mohammad 
Singer, R. Moh.
Siregar, Arief 
Soeka Soemitro 
Soekirno
Soemadhi, Achmad 
Soeparmin 
Soeprapto, Max 
Thaib, Djalaloeddin 
Toekiman 
Toekliwon 
Toha, Mohammad 
Winanta, Alibasah
Wiro Samiardjo (also Wiro S. Miardjo)
Background Affiliation
Dutch Navy SIBAR
unknown -  Arab descent SIBAR
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  PNI Baroe aloof
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  nationalist SIBAR
Digoel -  Pari SIBAR
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
unknown SIBAR
Civil Service SIBAR
Cabinet in exile SIBAR
Cabinet in exile SIBAR
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI unknown
Digoel -  Pari SIBAR?
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  Pari Parki
Dutch Navy SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  unknown SIBAR
seaman SIBAR
Digoel -  nationalist Parki
New Caledonia SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
seaman SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI aloof
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Civil Service SIBAR
Digoel -  Pari Parki
Digoel -  PNI Baroe SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  Pari SIBAR
seaman SIBAR
Digoel -  Permi SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  PKI SIBAR
Digoel -  Pari? Parki?
grouped into two categories: those willing to hold a permanent job on a monthly 
allowance, or irregularly as a daily laborer, a job that might be supplemented by work 
as an artisan, gardener, or fisherman. The number of Tanah Merah exiles reached a
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high of about 1,150 around 1930. It steadily decreased to 419 in the beginning of 1937, 
to 355 at the end of 1939, and to 295 (along with 212 family members) in 1943.1
Digoel was essentially forgotten after 1939, in the great upheaval of the World War. 
After the Germans occupied the Netherlands in May 1940, critical attention from the 
colonial mother country ceased altogether. Government leaders in Batavia had other 
worries, namely, to prepare for a confrontation with Japan.
Evacuation
In the beginning of 1943, the Allies feared a further thrust of the Japanese toward 
North Australia, which might be preceded by military actions to gain hold of South 
New Guinea, with Merauke on the south coast as Japan's most likely target. In this 
way, Digoel might become a war zone. Until then it remained untouched, except for 
the one-time appearance of a few Japanese war planes, which dropped a few bombs, 
an event that was hailed by many exiles.
On February 4,1943, a Dutch military report suggested that the exiles be evacuated; 
this was seconded by none less than the Allied commander in the Pacific, US General 
Douglas MacArthur, who feared that their "presence there might be the cause of unrest 
and fifth column activity." Van der Plas acted with great speed and submitted, on 
February 8, a formal proposal to evacuate Digoel as a matter of "urgent military 
necessity." He described the Tanah Tinggi inhabitants as "extremely dangerous 
psychopaths" and their counterparts in Tanah Merah as "less dangerous psychopaths," 
and he also labeled them all as "professional criminals," "antisocial people," and 
"probably a small number of communists [...] though their knowledge of communism 
is muddled." The Australians were reluctant to act for logistical reasons. An Australian 
military report argued that "The internees in question are of a most difficult and 
undesirable type, [...] are mostly [...] in country very difficult to access. In the 
somewhat remote contingency that they should fall into Japanese hands, it is hard to
1 On Digoel's history, including the slightly different number of internees, see: L. J. A. Schoonheyt, Boven- 
Digoel: Het land van Communisten en Kannibalen second ed. (Amsterdam/Batavia: Kolff, 1940 [1936]); I. F. M. 
Salim, Vijftien }aar Boven-Digoel Concentratiekamp in Nieuw-Guinea Bakermat van de lndonesische 
Onafhankelijkheid (Amsterdam: Contact, 1973); Anthony van Kampen, Een Kwestie van Macht: Het Bewogen 
Leven van de Arts Dr. L. }. A. Schoonheyt in het Voormalige Nederlandsch-Indie, Nieuw-Guinea, Suriname en 
Nederland (Bussum: Unieboek, 1975); Citra dan Perjuangan Perintis Kemerdekaan Seri Perjuangan Ex Digul 
(Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Bantuan Sosial, Departemen Sosial, 1977); L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden in de Tzveede Wereldoorlog: Deel 11A Nederlands-Indie I (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1984); L. de Jong, Het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tzveede Wereldoorlog: Deel 11C Nederlands-Indie III (Leiden: Nijhoff, 1986); L. 
A. Peeperkorn-van Donselaar, "Interneringskamp Boven-Digoel, 1926-1943," Leidsclwift 2,6 (1986): 33-69; 
Takashi Shiraishi, "The Phantom World of Digoel," Indonesia 61 (April 1996): 13-48; Takashi Shiraishi, 
Hantu Digul: Politik Pengamanan Politik Zaman Kolonial (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001); Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 
ed., Cerita dari Digul (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2001); Margaret J. Kartomi, The Gamelan Digul and the Prison Camp 
Musician Who Built It: An Australian Link with the Indonesian Revolution (Rochester, NY: University of 
Rochester Press, 2002); Margaret J. Kartomi, Gamelan Digul di Balik Sosok Seorang Pejuang: Hubungan antara 
Australia dan Revolusi Indonesia (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005); Marco Kartodikromo, Pergaulan 
Orang Buangan di Boven Digoel (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2002); Purnama Suwardi, Koloni Pengucilan Boven Digoel 
([Jakarta]: Agung HikmahNya, 2003); Paul Tickell, "A Thoroughly Modern Prison-Camp: Boven-Digoel 
and Modernity in the Late Colonial Indies" (unpublished paper presented at a conference, nd); Rudolf 
Mrazek, "Boven Digoel and Terezin: Camps at the Time of Triumphant Technology," East Asian Science, 
Technology, and Society 3,2/3 (2010): 287-314; and Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, Tanah Merah yang Merah: 
Sebuah Catatan Sejarah (Bandung: Ultimus, 2010).
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see that any harm would be done in any way commensurate with the extent of 
resources necessary for their removal and internment in Australia." The Australians' 
misgivings were to no avail, and the Dutch decision to evacuate was made on March 1, 
1943. Van der Plas left the next day for Merauke and Digoel to organize the operation.2
He wrote to Van Mook on April 18, 1943, about his visit to Digoel, stating that, in 
general, the settlement itself had made a favorable impression on him, but that
... the atmosphere among the internees was horrible. The Muslims and a single 
fanatical communist have adjusted themselves best. Further you may see men 
aged twenty-seven years, who are grey and broken after ten years of internment. 
Very old looking men, using walking-sticks, in reality have not even reached the 
age of fifty. There is a lot of mutual hatred and envy; the people of Tanah Tinggi 
are lunatics, all living in barricaded houses, armed with wooden spears, who are 
out for each other's lives. [...] I spent a lot of time with the internees, was 
available day and night for discussion and went through the complete 
evacuation.3
Van der Plas had chosen the carrot of democratic reform to secure an evacuation 
without internees' opposition. Thus, he addressed the internees in a respectful way, 
even as if they were already "Rijksgenoten" (partners in the Dutch-Indonesian union 
to come). In a gathering with all of the inmates, Van der Plas asked for cooperation in 
the war against fascism. Those internees not yet apathetic or demented agreed to this, 
albeit they knew very little of developments beyond their community. They supported 
anti-fascism and stood behind the Allies in defense of democracy, even if doing so 
entailed working with the Dutch. Among the PNI Baroe internees, cooperation was the 
obvious choice.4 The PKI members were still in doubt. Sardjono was the de facto leader 
of the group because of his having been chairman of the party in 1926. A comrade 
whom Sardjono spoke to in Australia later reported that
2 Quotations from Pat Noonan, "Merdeka in Mackay: The Indonesian Evacuees and Internees inMackay, 
June 1943-February 1946," Kabar Seberang 24/25 (1995): 240-42, 246, who bases his analysis on Australian 
archival sources. In hearings before the Inquiry Committee about Dutch government policies during the 
war (Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945: Deel 3C, Financieel en Economisch Beleid: Verhoren ['s- 
Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij-en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1949], p. 773, and Enquetecommissie Regeringsbddd 1940- 
1945: Deel 8C-1, 2, Militair Beleid 1940-1945; Verhoren ['s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 
1956], p. 406), on May 31 and July 14,1949, Van Mook mentioned these considerations again. On February 
20,1953, Van der Plas, during his hearing (Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, vol. 8C-2, p. 1363), 
added to this that MacArthur intended to abandon Merauke and had already withdrawn his troops. The 
Australian Army was planning to do so, too. Van der Plas's plea to the Australians not to withdraw from 
this last free Netherlands Indies territory met with success. The Australians changed their minds, but 
insisted on the evacuation of Digoel. One might wonder whether Van der Plas was right here. Japanese 
occupation of Merauke would make Australia itself more vulnerable to Japanese attacks, or was this 
already not considered a plausible option anymore? See also De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 
11A, p. 139.
2 This letter of April 18, 1943, in Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, collection 176 H. J. van Mook, entry no. 
2.21.123, inventory no. 8, also quoted by De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 11A, pp. 139-40. Van 
der Plas here also refers to an earlier evacuation in mid-1942, when the Dutch forced the exiles, on very 
short notice, to go to Merauke and a village along the Bian River. The plan was badly coordinated and, 
after the Australian Navy declined to provide further transport, the exiles were returned to Digoel (see De 
Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 11C, p. 139).
4Molly Bondan, Spanning a Revolution: The Story of Mohamad Bondan and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement 
(Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1992), p. 182.
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[Sardjono] and other prisoners did not know what the second world war was all 
about. They had only the vaguest idea of Japanese operations and intentions in 
the Netherlands Indies. Sardjono was the only revolutionary leader in the world 
who did not know that Trotsky had left the Soviet Union and was dead, Hitler 
had seized power in Germany, Italians had colonized Abyssinia, Spain had 
suffered a civil war, Japan had conquered much of China, and Germany had 
invaded the USSR.5
This seems to be somewhat of an exaggeration, but there is more than a kernel of truth 
in it.
Van der Plas spoke also to Salim (incarcerated in Digoel since 1928 on flimsy 
accusations, and, as a non-partisan, widely respected among the exiles), and to Salim's 
astonishment respectfully addressed him as "Meneer" (Sir) and "U" (you, polite form 
of address). In a personal meeting with Van der Plas, Salim was easily convinced to 
cooperate in the evacuation. In Salim's opinion, there was no alternative.6 The sources 
that relate the general willingness to cooperate do not seem to be altogether reliable, 
however. Later on, Van der Plas himself noted that he had encountered "enmity, 
rudeness, and overwroughtness"7 when meeting the exiles.
Van der Plas was a rather unusual Dutch official who had become "a semi- 
legendary figure [...] with nearly as much fantasy as fact attached to his name."8 
Knowledgeable Indonesians considered him the brains behind any clever Dutch 
strategy. He spoke the most important Indonesian languages fluently, probably the 
only one in the highest Indies ranks to do so, and certainly in Australia he was the one 
who set out the policies regarding the Indonesians there, and was the one official to 
address them, as his Digoel expedition shows. He personally knew most of the 
Indonesian elites, and treated them on an equal footing with the Dutch. He also 
prepared and evaluated propaganda and intelligence directed towards occupied 
Indonesia. These activities contributed to his reputation among some as being shady 
and untrustworthy—many presupposed him to be involved in conspiracies and 
hidden agendas. He also was a flamboyant personality to whom none of the cliches of 
Dutch officialdom applied.9
5 Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada (Sydney South: Australian Book Society, 1975), p. 28.
6 Salim, Vijftien ]aar Boven-Digoel, p. 344.
7 Memorandum of Van der Plas, January 12,1945, in NA, collection 251, Ch.O. van der Plas, entry no. 
2.21.266, inventory no. 30.
8 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1952), p. 379.
9 William H. Frederick, "The Man Who Knew Too Much: Ch.O. Van der Plas and the Future of Indonesia, 
1927-1950," in Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism 1930-1957, ed. Hans Antlov and Stein 
Tonnesson (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), pp. 34—62, is the most serious attempt to describe Van 
der Plas's career and measure the motives and importance of "the man who knew too much," as he titled 
his article. (The Kahin quote, above, was referenced by Frederick.) De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
vol. 11C, pp. 30-37, also supplies a useful contribution to the Van der Plas biography.
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The Transfer to Australia
Without too much opposition, 524 Digoel inhabitants—316 men (22 from Tanah 
Tinggi), 69 women, and 139 children—were brought by plane, ship, and train to the 
Cowra Prisoners of War and Internees Camp, about two hundred kilometers east of 
Sydney, in New South Wales. They arrived in June 1943. The twenty-two Tanah Tinggi 
veterans were kept apart from the others and put in jail in Liverpool, near Sydney. The 
Cowra camp housed Japanese and Italian prisoners of war, and to their compounds 
was now added a barbed-wire section where, under the same rules as applied to POWs, 
the new Indonesian contingent was held. Ostensibly, the Dutch had succeeded in 
convincing the relevant Australian officials that here enemies of the Allies were held, 
not political prisoners of a colonial regime.
In a matter of days, six exiles were released, as Van der Plas recruited them to work 
for the government in exile, which urgently needed Indonesian expertise, especially in 
translation services. Five of the six were of PNI Baroe background: Boerhanoedin, 
Moerwoto, Soeka Soemitro, Maskoen Soemadiredja, and T. A. Moerad. Moenandar, a 
Pari exile, was the exception. Van der Plas was full of praise for these six and 
commented that among the Digoelists were a great number of excellent people who 
could be used in official service.
During their journey away from Digoel, the exiles handed out or dropped notes 
and letters about their plight and background to Australian guards and onlookers. 
Some of those communications were delivered to the intended addressees. Among 
them was the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), which was, of course, interested in 
coming to the rescue of its Indonesian comrades. It was not a very strong party at that 
time, and was recovering from a period spent underground, after the party was 
banned in June 1940, due to its agitation against the Allied powers. When Germany 
invaded the Soviet Union in July 1941, the CPA came out in the open again and joined 
the war effort against the Axis. Traditionally, trade unions were strong in Australia, 
and radical, too. They also had had experiences with Indonesians and the Dutch in the 
first years of the war, as noted below. And there were organizations, like the Civil 
Rights Defense League, that approached the Labor government, and confronted it with 
a number of awkward questions concerning democratic rights and the extent to which 
Dutch extraterritorial jurisdiction stretched. The press added fuel to the CPA's 
indignation. The combined pressure soon took effect. Australian officials visited Cowra 
and wrote their recommendations. The minister of external affairs, H. V. Evatt, wrote 
on November 16,1943, to W. B. Simpson, director general of security:
In my opinion the whole thing will have to be thoroughly investigated for the 
sake of the reputation of this country [...] but [...] it is vital that their detention 
should be terminated at the earliest possible moment. You should not be limited 
or restricted by the conditions suggested by the Dutch.1"
The Dutch and Australians met on November 22,1943, and agreed on the release of 
all internees no later than December 13, 1943. On December 7, 1943, 150 men were 
transferred to the semi-military Australian Employment Company in Wallangarra, and 
to nearby Toowoomba and Helidon, where they supported the war effort by working 10
10 Noonan, "Merdeka inMackay," pp. 244-45.
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on farms and in an enormous ammunition depot. Wallangarra was situated in 
Queensland, not too far from Dutch Headquarters in Camp Casino, near Brisbane. But 
332 men, women, and children still remained in Cowra, as the Tanah Tinggi men were 
still in Liverpool. It seemed nigh impossible to find a place for these exiles that the 
Australians and Dutch could both approve, the Dutch still demanding strict conditions 
on the internees' movements and employment. It took until April 1944 before the 
group was moved to Mackay, in Queensland, a coastal town with a pleasant climate."
In Wallangarra, around New Year's Day 1944, two PKI exiles, Sardjono and 
Alibasah Winanta, left to enter Dutch service, certainly after having discussed their 
political position with the Dutch.1 2
The Digoel evacuation was, in retrospect, not a successful enterprise. Van der Plas, 
or, for that matter, the Dutch, had tricked the internees into voluntarily moving to 
Australia, only to lock them up once again. What goodwill the Dutch, still or again, 
had gained among the detainees could be expected to have disappeared with the 
internees' prolonged custody in Cowra. And the Australians themselves were insulted 
by the gross violation of basic democratic rights being imposed by the Dutch on its 
territory. Was there no one in Dutch circles able to foresee such a development? Did 
they consider themselves unassailable and free to deal with the Indonesians in 
Australia as they pleased?
Indonesians in Australia
The Digoel internees were not the first Indonesian refugees in Australia. Shortly 
after the Dutch surrendered, in March 1942, Dutch merchant ships made their way to 
Australia. The overwhelming majority of crew members were Indonesians. Not all of 
these sailors were willing to risk their lives to support Allied shipping. Moreover, they 
were paid far less than Dutch crew members doing the same work, so there was that 
disincentive, too. Australian trade unions supported the seamen's demands for equal 
treatment and helped in coordinating a strike in April 1942. It resulted in about seven 
hundred Indonesian seamen being arrested and ultimately put behind fences in Cowra. 
About fifteen hundred seamen remained at work, and regularly called at ports in 
Australia, where they had to find lodging. Moreover, a number of Indonesians who 
were on active duty in the Dutch army and navy had escaped from the Indies, and 
their ranks swelled with units arriving from New Guinea. Scattered groups of 
Indonesians were also "discovered," among them a group that had worked for decades 
in New Caledonia. They all fell under the care of the Dutch government in exile, which 
initially lacked the means to manage these heterogeneous groups in a vast country at 
war. Communication thus was difficult, also because many of the Indonesian exiles 
stranded in Australia were barely literate. From an Australian's point of view, 
Australian society was not used to the presence of colored people on its territory, other
11 On the release of the six exiles, see H. M., "Tabir Rahasia SIBAR," Murba, July 18,1948. The numbers of 
inhabitants and people transported show slight variations among different sources. Koesalah Soebagyo 
Toer, Tanah Merah yang Merah, p. 70, reports that nine men stayed behind in Digoel. Van der Plas's praise 
comes from a letter to Loekman Djajadiningrat, July 1943, quoted in De Jong, I let Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden, vol. 11C, pp. 142—43.
12 H. M„ "Tabir Rahasia SIBAR," Murba, July 20,1948.
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than Aboriginals, and a strict immigration policy existed to ensure an all-white 
Australia. Thus, the influx of Indonesians was unsettling to some.
The Dutch government set up a structure by which the Indonesians could find 
lodging, work, allowances, and other help, and through which it could also control 
their movements. In the main ports, Rumah Indonesia (Indonesia House) were 
established as meeting places. A general complaint, however, remained that the Dutch 
were not able to abandon their colonial racism and feelings of superiority. Thus, all the 
lofty words about building a new relationship after the war in which the partners in 
the new kingdom would cooperate on an equal footing became empty phrases.13
Finally, there was the Netherlands Indies Government Information Service, noted 
earlier, which had been founded in Melbourne in April 1942 as a cooperative effort of 
the commission, army, and navy. Its tasks included being a press agency, monitoring 
radio broadcasts from occupied Indonesia, broadcasting to Indonesia, and 
photographing and filming news and events. The NIGIS staff initially numbered about 
thirty, with only a minority being Indonesian. This changed as staff increased to 
probably more than a hundred in the last year of the war. Not a minor task of NIGIS 
involved the publication of two journals. The one for Dutch readers was named Oranje 
and was published, first, every two weeks, and, from September 1944 on, twice weekly.
Penjoeloeh
Oranje's Indonesian-language equivalent, but with very different content, was 
Penjoeloeh (The Torch).14 This journal's first issue appeared on August 21,1942, with the 
subtitle "Soerat chabar oentoek pergaoelan Belanda dan Indonesia di Pacific-Selatan" 
(Journal for the Dutch and Indonesian Community in the South Pacific). Its banner also 
mentioned Editie Melajoe (Malay edition), to indicate the relationship with Oranje. The 
editor was given as NIGIS, but no individual names were mentioned. Its size, in 
general, was sixteen pages. It was distributed free of charge. After half a year, a cover 
with a full page illustration was added to the journal. The contents followed a pattern: 
an editorial and world news, followed by news from the Netherlands, Indonesia, East 
Asia, and Australia. Speeches by Dutch authorities were published, among them 
Queen Wilhelmina's December 7, 1942, speech, which opened—cautiously—new 
opportunities for the postwar Dutch-Indonesian relationship. Also included were 
letters to the editor, rarely signed. A few times an anonymous Indonesian contributed 
an essay on religion. There was room for poetry with propagandistic contents, with 
acrostics in high favor. In the Australia section, activities relating to the Indonesians 
were reported, but only minimally. Thus, some activities in the Rumah Indonesia were 
preserved in print. The first issue opened with an article, complete with the cliches to 
be expected, by Loekman Djajadiningrat. Each issue carried some ten photographs, 
many of which pictured Dutch royalty and authorities. As for Indonesians, only 
Loekman and Minister Soejono were honored with a portrait. For the rest, Indonesians 
in Australia remained anonymous. There was a slight change in the second year of the
13 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 11C, pp. 124-30.
14 Ibid., pp. 152-53. About the first year of NIGIS, see "N.I.G.I.S. Beroesia Satoe Tahoen," Penjoeloeh, April 
30,1943.
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journal. In January 1944, to cover war events in a more up-to-date way, the four pages 
of the new Oetoesan Penjoeloeh were issued twice a week.15 This supplement gave 
Penjoeloeh the opportunity to be more reflective. More Indonesians submitted articles 
on a regular basis to it, but under pseudonyms like Sontolojo, Mas Sikoet, and 
Sapanama, the last one the pen name of Boerhanoedin, one of the PNI Baroe Digoelists 
recruited by Van der Plas.
These Indonesians must all have been members of the Penjoeloeh editorial team, but 
their names were not given in the journal's colophon. It was only indirectly that their 
names became public. First, in March 1944, fifteen Indonesian men and one woman 
posed for a group photograph, which was published in one of the issues. The caption 
indicated that those pictured constituted the complete editorial staff of Penjoeloeh. 
Names were not given.16 In the second anniversary issue, in August 1944, the captions 
of eight scattered photographs disclosed the names of the Indonesian employees.
Boerhanoedin and Sardjono, the PKI leader, were head and deputy head of the 
Malay Department. Hadji Moechlis, Sayid Abdurrahman Almassawa, and Pieter 
Kalalo were in the Malay Broadcasting Department, with the first two also 
broadcasting Islamic religious messages, with Quran readings as well. Editorial staff of 
Oetoesan Penjoeloeh included Maskoen, Moerad, and Soeka. Boerhanoedin's wife 
worked as a typist.17
Already in early 1944, the lineup thus featured five former Digoel internees as the 
mouthpieces of the Dutch government. Boerhanoedin, Maskoen, Moerad, and Soeka 
had all been sent to Digoel because of their activities in the PNI Baroe of Sjahrir and 
Hatta, and were motivated by the principled anti-fascist stance of their party. Sardjono 
was another case, but his communist party and the Dutch government had approved 
this marriage of convenience. Nowhere was it indicated that these five men were 
former Digoel inmates.
In 1944, the entire twenty-eight-member-strong NIGIS staff signed a card with 
Christmas greetings and full of lofty praise to Van der Plas. Among the staff were more 
than ten PKI exiles, six from PNI Baroe, two from Pari, and one from Permi.18
Over the years, in all the pages of Penjoeloeh, the Digoel camp was never mentioned 
once, nor was the evacuation of the internees to Cowra. Cowra was mentioned in some 
of the many poems that Penjoeloeh printed when place and date were given. And quite 
a number, drenched in nostalgia, were written by the prolific Arief Siregar, an exile 
who signed these with his full name.
15 "Oetoesan Penjoeloeh," Penjoeloeh, February 4,1944. Two Dutch libraries have a run of Oetoesan 
Penjoeloeh that, in both cases, end with no. 61 of August 15,1944, when the journal was discontinued. 
Penjoeloeh thereafter appeared two, then three times a week (see Redaksi, "'Penjoeloeh' dengan 
Perdjoangan Kebebasan," Penjoeloeh, July 7 and July 21,1944).
16 Penjoeloeh, March 7,1944.
17 See Penjoeloeh, August 4, 1944; and Muslimia, "Penghidoepan Peladjar2 Bangsa Indonesia di Hedjaz!!!" 
Penjoeloeh, May 26,1944.
18 In NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30. The twenty-eight signatories could not all be traced to determine 
their background. A few bear East Indonesian names, one a Chinese, and one a Dutch. Here and elsewhere 
information on the background of the exiles is taken from Koesalah Soebagyo Toer, Tanah Merah yang 
Merah.
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A short report on October 1, 1943, related the celebration in Cowra of the Islamic 
New Year 1363, referring to Cowra as where "about five hundred Indonesians from 
New Guinea were quarantined."19 Information about who they were and how they got 
there was not given. One author, whose identity was never revealed, who used the 
pseudonym Abimanju, when writing in January 1944 in Cowra about the dangers of 
fascism, hinted at his background:
The cruelty and maliciousness [of the Japanese] with respect to the Indonesian 
people is worse than that of the former Dutch government. I frankly 
acknowledge this as an Indonesian who for more than sixteen years suffered the 
bitterness and exasperation of living in a dense jungle, because I was exiled by 
the Dutch government. But [...] the Japanese cruelty and its worldwide 
conspiracies made me [...] willing to sacrifice anything that is requested by the 
Dutch government and its allies [...]. All the agony I have suffered is already 
forgotten, and there are no feelings of revenge at all in relation to the former 
Dutch government, as suffering and misery have to be borne by all people's 
leaders [,..]20
Another letter to the editor came still closer. Abioso (unsolved pseudonym) wrote 
from Cowra that all Indonesians, whether nationalist or communist, Muslim or 
Christian, had the duty to free Indonesia from Japanese fascism. This was in particular 
the obligation of communists, and Abioso continued that, after the war broke out in the 
Indies, "the communists in exile in a part of Dutch New Guinea" volunteered to fight 
with the Dutch, and even were ready to return to their exile after Japan was defeated.21
Penjoeloeh went into its third year, in August 1944, with the intention to appear 
more frequently—at first two, and, later, three times a week. Its goal basically 
remained the same: to foster the fighting spirit to free Indonesia from fascism. But the 
editorial staff foresaw practical problems as staff members were moved to other tasks 
and no replacements were employed.22 A loss certainly was the appointment in June 
1944 of Boerhanoedin as one of the first five Public Relations Officers of the colonial 
army KNIL. Together with his four Dutch colleagues, he was sent to newly liberated 
areas of the Indies to aid the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) in the re­
establishment of civil society. In the press report it was disclosed that Boerhanoedin 
headed the Malay Department of the NIGIS, but his Digoel past remained 
unmentioned.23 Boerhanoedin was also instrumental in the establishment of Mekkah- 
Fonds (Mekka Fund), which helped Indonesian religious students who found 
themselves in dire straits in Saudi Arabia. It all followed an appeal in Penjoeloeh.24 On 
the board of the fund, four exiles joined Almassawa, whose Arab background qualified 
him as chairman. Boerhanoedin and Moerad were joined by Hadji Djalaloeddin Thaib
19"1 Sjawal 1363: Hari Raja di Cowra," Penjoeloeh, October 29,1943.
20 Abimanju, "Kemerdekaan Mesti Timboel di Doenia," Penjoeloeh, January 21,1944. In the same vein, see 
Abimanju, "Menoedjoe Indonesia Merdeka," Penjoeloeh, March 17,1944.
21 Abioso, "Kewadjiban," Penjoeloeh, April 14,1944.
22 Redaksi, "'Penjoeloeh' Beroesia Doea Tahoen," Penjoeloeh, August 4,1944.
23 "Benoeman Baroe," Oetoesan Penjoeloeh, June 23,1944. From April to September 1944, Allied Forces 
landed on New Guinea's north coast and on the small island of Morotai and established bases. However, 
the war was not over, and mopping-up operations continued for many months.
24 Muslimia, "Penghidoepan Peladjar2 Bangsa Indonesia di Hedjaz!!!"
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(of Permi) and Alibasah Winanta (PKI). The committee met with success, as attested to 
by the regular lists of donors in Penjoeloeh. And the Dutch government, by facilitating 
the fund's actions, showed its commitment to improving the lot of its pious subjects in 
Arabia.25
SIBAR Founded
On May 24, 1944, sixteen Indonesians met as members of the Raad van 
Departementshoofden to discuss the formation of an association of the Indonesians in 
Australia and reconquered Indonesia. The meeting took place on the initiative of 
Sardjono and Ma'moen A1 Rasjid Koesoemadilaga, a doctor in government service 
(and Loekman Djajadiningrat's successor as a member of the Raad van 
Departmentshoofden after his untimely death in July 1944). Loekman, shortly before 
his demise, also took part in the meeting, as did R. Moh. Singer, who was a wedana 
(district head) in Digoel before its evacuation; two navy lieutenants, Abdoelrachman 
Atmosoediredjo and M. Nelwan; a former civil servant, Limahelu; former navigating 
officer E. Runtulalo; Poedjosoebroto, who had a New Caledonia background; 
Almassawa; and seven exiles: Boerhanoedin, Soeka, Maskoen, T. A. Moerad, Hadji 
Djalaloeddin Thaib, Sardjono, and Winanta. The majority were working with NIGIS, or 
somehow involved with it. All agreed with the idea of forming an association, and a 
committee of five was commissioned to work out the details. Sardjono was trusted to 
chair the committee, with Almassawa, Poedjosoebroto, Djalaloeddin Thaib, and 
Nelwan as other members. The committee drafted statutes, by-laws, and a founding 
statement. These were all discussed with Van der Plas, who consented. On August 6, 
1944, the new organization, Serikat Indonesia Baroe (SIBAR, Association for a New 
Indonesia), was officially founded. Sardjono became chairman; Almassawa, secretary; 
and Runtulalo, treasurer. Djalaloeddin Thaib, Poedjosoebroto, Maskoen, and 
Abdoelrachman completed the board.26 SIBAR's most important document, the 
Founding Statement, is included on the next page.
The criticism in the Founding Statement is severe, and the majority of the Dutch 
living in Australia, if only they could read Indonesian, would have disapproved 
strongly. But Van der Plas swallowed it, as did Loekman and Ma'moen, probably for 
the sake of the broad cooperation it promised. They could not object to the lines on the 
struggle between fascism and democracy, and the references to the Atlantic Charter 
and the promises in the Queen's December 7 speech. And the last line probably served 
to wash down the bitter taste. Curiously, SIBAR was never discussed in the meetings 
of the Raad van Departementshoofden until the end of the war. Was it an affair of Van 
der Plas and the Indonesian members of the Raad, Loekman and Ma'moen, and was it 
better not to involve others with the scheme?27 And does the fact SIBAR was never 
mentioned in Oranje indicate that it was deemed better not to cause commotion among 
the Dutch community? Even without detailed knowledge of their political sympathies,
25 "Mekkah-Fonds," Oetoesnn Penjoeloeh, July 25,1944.
26 Pemberita, "Serikat Indonesia Baroe (SIBAR)," Penjoeloeh, August 18,1944; "Openbare Vergadering 
SIBAR," Penjoeloeh, August 9 and August 13,1945.
27 "Korte Verslagen van de Vergaderingen van de Raad van Departmentshoofden, mei 1944-augustus 
1945," in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 8.
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Founding Statement—Serikat Indonesia Baroe28 
la In the past, before the Second World War, for some time already in Indonesia were founded 
political movements of different kinds, which demanded an end to racial discrimination, and 
freedom of speech, writing, assembly and association, and demanded people's rights in 
political matters, to have a hand in the organization of government in Indonesia, in a broad 
sense, so that in the end it will be able to stand on its own feet and obtain a position at the 
same level with any other people in the whole world, 
lb The Dutch government is a government that embraces the principle of democracy, but in this 
respect, it is limited to the territory of the Netherlands only. Freedom of speech, writing, 
assembly and association, and the right to have a hand in the organization of government of 
the country, that is the right to vote (active) and the right to be elected (passive) to become a 
member of a people's representative body to make laws for the whole "Kingdom," with the 
name of "Parlement" or "Staten Generaal," is only a right possessed by the Dutch people in 
the Netherlands. The Indonesian people that also are a people within the '"Dutch Kingdom" 
do not have the freedom and rights mentioned above. Although the government carried out 
"Decentralisatie," installed Volksraad [semi-parliamentary body] and executed the 
"Indianisatie" policy, these government measures are not yet sufficient to satisfy the 
demands of the Indonesian people's movement. Until the coming of the rapacious Japanese 
[the Dutch] government and | the Indonesian] people had not yet found a basis for 
agreement.
2a The Second World War is not a war between one people and another one, but a war between 
two political systems. That is fascism and democracy. The two systems cannot exist next to 
each other. It is only one that can survive. For that reason, the struggle is very violent—this 
struggle to capture this place [world power]. "Fascism" is a new system that is on the 
offensive here and there to look for this position [foothold], while "Democracy" as an older 
system, that already holds a position, has to defend this position.
2b To avert the danger of "Fascism," all countries that embrace "the Principle of Democracy" as 
the basis of their government have united. This unity, that is sustained by the Atlantic 
Charter, that amongst other things contains the obligation that the countries involved [in the 
Charter] will respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government they want 
and that they intend to return the sovereign rights and the right to govern themselves to all 
peoples that have lost these, because they were deprived of these by force.
The Dutch government, as a Democratic government, and a member of the United 
Nations, has already taken measures to establish a new Government system for all its 
"Kingdom" (including Indonesia and the West Indies), a system with democratic features 
that does not distinguish between races. And it also hopes to work together with the 
Indonesian people in general and the Indonesians that reside outside their fatherland (for 
instance, in Australia) in particular, in its effort to reach and establish a "New System."
3 By making public this hope, the [Dutch] Government begins to find an agreement with us, 
the Indonesian people, which for such a long time continuously lived at such a great 
distance. And the hand stretched out towards us we accept wholeheartedly. This reaction is 
not an individual act on the basis of our personal desire, but by a people that is united in an 
association that also is filled with the spirit of democracy.
Next we also realize that at this time we do not possess the means that will allow us to 
establish a "New System" for Indonesia, but that we have to cooperate with other peoples 
that already have the experience of standing on their own feet, at the same level with any 
other people in the world.
The people who [will be] our partner in the achievement of that goal has already been decided 
by the course of time, and it will be the Dutch people.
_________________________________________________________________________August 194429
there was discord among the Dutch in Australia as to the exiles. As one of them put it, 
money was misused to spoil them and lots of money was spent on their nutrition, 
housing, clothing, and allowances.30
JSI translated this from the original Malay, and, by translating literally, I hope that I have retained its 
purposeful ambiguity and vagueness. The long, awkward sentences show how much this text was a 
compromise.
29 "Keterangan Pendirian 'Serikat Indonesia Baroe' (SIBAR)," Penjoeloeh, February 7,1945.
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In the statutes, SIBAR's aims were formulated as: a. To endeavor, together with the 
Dutch government, to accomplish the liberation of Indonesia from the enemy; b. To 
prepare the basis for a new, democratic Indonesia. It was explicitly stated that SIBAR 
would not infringe upon the laws of the Dutch and Australian governments. SIBAR 
was to solicit members, all of whom had to pay an admission fee and a monthly 
subscription. In places with at least twenty-five members, a branch was established. 
Highest authority rested with the congress, to be convened once a year.30 1
Curiously, the founding statement was not included in full in Penjoeloeh. The 
concluding statement about the lasting cooperation with the Dutch, however, was 
quoted or adapted regularly. It took until February 7, 1945, before the entire founding 
statement was published in Penjoeloeh. Until then, anyone interested could write to 
NIGIS to request that SIBAR documents be sent to him or her.32 The absence of the 
published statement seems to have been a sign of uneasiness on the Dutch authorities' 
part.
Sardjono himself contributed two articles to Penjoeloeh in the period when SIBAR's 
contents took shape. The first article emphasizes the spirit of democracy that provided 
the worldwide motivation to fight against Germany and Japan. The article goes on to 
state that, in Indonesia, in the past, promises of democratic reform were not kept, 
notwithstanding the demands of the political parties. The Dutch government could 
ignore these demands because the people at large did not support them. And, he adds: 
"A sharp kelewang [sword] might bring about a change, but only temporarily, because 
there is no kelewang, how sharp it might be, that cannot be broken by the common 
people, when it is convinced that it needs to be broken."33 And Sardjono continues: 
"Why should we, the Indonesians, join the defense of the Allies? We have never had 
democratic rights; these were taken from us by force. We must struggle on to obtain 
these rights, and we know that the Dutch government now is ready to allow 
democratic reforms. And thus we have common interests. And we will see that after 
the war no colored people will not be governing itself."34
In a second article, Sardjono points to the Queen's December 7 speech, the one in 
which she acknowledged past mistakes and promised to end racial discrimination. If 
this does not happen, he writes, the Dutch government will be taken to task by the 
Great Powers America, England, China, and Russia. The people who never enjoyed 
complete democratic rights will now have to dedicate themselves to achieve these, in 
cooperation with the Dutch.35
30 Hearing L. E. C. van Bovene-Beynon, May 31,1949, Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, vol. 3C, 
p. 769.
31 "Perhi mpoenan Serikat Indonesia Baroe (SIBAR)," Penjoeloeh, August 25,1944. The complete statutes 
and bylaws are only available, in translation, in Australian Archives (AA) Canberra Series A989/1, item 
44/ 600/ 5/1/8 and Canberra A 6122/ 40-136. It is stated here that these were approved by the SIBAR 
congress on September 6,1944, at what probably amounted to a meeting of the founders.
32 "Perhimpoenan Serikat Indonesia Baroe (SIBAR)," Penjoeloeh, August 25,1944.
33 Sardjono, "Apa jang Haroes Kita Bela," Penjoeloeh, May 26,1944.
34 Ibid.
35 Sardjono, "Bersalah Paham," Penjoeloeh, June 9,1944.
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SIBAR Actions
In Penjoeloeh, news about tangible SIBAR activities was absent. In its articles, 
including one by Sardjono, the usual sentences about the union of Indonesians and 
Dutch against Japan and for a new democratic Indonesia, without discrimination based 
on race or legislation, were now followed by an optimistic reference to SIBAR and its 
future role.36
In an article on September 4, 1944, it was hoped that SIBAR would become the 
vehicle by which the Indonesian people could receive political education in democracy 
and its workings.3' Similarly, on October 18, 1944, it was vaguely reported that SIBAR 
was not yet able to become active as certain conditions had not yet been met.38 39
Menderita (pseudonym, translated as "one who suffers") writes about SIBAR in an 
ecstatic tone as the culmination of the Indonesian people's wishes and hopes, asserting 
that SIBAR will bring freedom in political, economic, and social respects.14 The poetic 
veins were opened by SIBAR and acrostics ranging from five to forty lines adorned the 
journal. This example is titled "SIBAR," by Sawun Uba:40
S ibar itoe soeatoe perhimpoenan,
I ndonesia Baroe, akan dirantjangnja!
B ersama dgn. Pemerintah Nederland,
A kan mengoesir semoea moesoehnja! 
R a'jat Indonesia, Insjaflah semoea!!!
Sibar is an association
Of the new Indonesia that 
will be designed
Together with the Dutch 
government
All enemies will be driven away
People of Indonesia, 
all be aware of this
At the branch level, there was activity that was not covered in Penjoeloeh. In 
Mackay, a committee of three PKI exiles—Ditawilastra, Toekiman, and Haroen Al- 
Rasjid—was formed on August 29, 1944, and they invited exiles living there to meet to 
form a SIBAR branch. The Dutch representative in Mackay allowed the committee to 
form a SIBAR branch.41 Without such permission a branch was formed in Camp
36 Sardjono, "Bangsa Indonesia tidak Berlalai-lalai," Penjoeloeh, September 4,1944; Si'mbah, "Kenangan 
pada Masa Datang," Penjoeloeh, September 11,1944. Si'mbah called SIBAR the signpost to the new 
democratic order; see Si'mbah, "Tiba Waktoenja Kita Berkemas," Penjoeloeh, September 27,1944.
37 "Pendidikan Politik," Penjoeloeh, September 4,1944.
38 T., "Persatoean Kita dan Indonesia Baroe," Penjoeloeh, October 18,1944.
39 Menderita, "Samboetan Ra'jat Indonesia terhadap 'Serikat Indonesia Baroe,"' Penjoeloeh, November 8, 
1944.
40 Sawun Uba, "SIBAR," Penjoeloeh, September 1,1944.
41 English translation of the convocation letter and letter of the district security officer, Mackay, to the 
deputy director of security, K. C. Plumb, Brisbane, September 12,1944. The addressee replied on 
September 25,1944, that the organization should be kept under discreet observation and that communist 
attempts to infiltrate or influence SIBAR should be reported. The letter from W. B. Simpson, director 
general of security, Canberra, to K. C. Plumb (deputy director of security), Brisbane, November 21,1944, 
summarizes Australian intelligence concerning SIBAR. All documents in AA Canberra A6122/40-136.
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Casino,42 and a third branch, probably without permission, was established in 
Sydney.43
The Australian Security Service reported that the Netherlands Forces Intelligence 
Service (NEFIS) called SIBAR the "natural consequence of the growing trend toward 
Indonesian unity." According to the report, the Dutch government recognizes "that a 
return to the old order is out of the question and is prepared to compromise with the 
Indonesians, offering them a greater part in the government of the N.E.I. [Netherlands 
East Indies] than hitherto. [...] Persons like Van der Plas have long foreseen what the 
future holds in the N.E.I. and are hastily climbing onto the Indonesian bandwagon." 
Moreover, NEFIS reported reassuringly that a NEFIS special agent was a member of 
the SIBAR board and "may be relied upon to report any undesirable developments."44
On November 8, 1944, the SIBAR Board informed Penjoeloeh readers that it was not 
yet able to engage in public activities, as it had not received permission yet from the 
Australian government to do so. The Dutch government had advised SIBAR that such 
permission was necessary, and, as SIBAR did not want to offend its host, it followed 
this advice. This explained why there had not been meetings or any other public 
SIBAR presence as yet.45 And, one may add, why branch level activity went unreported.
It was only on December 12, 1944, that Van der Plas wrote his letter to Minister of 
External Affairs Evatt, at the request of SIBAR, to ask whether "a special permission 
from the Commonwealth Government is needed to work openly in Australia among 
Indonesians residing in or passing through Australia." He added a passage about 
SIBAR's mission:
In its original composition the association was sincerely intended to devote its 
activities to furthering the war effort by making the Indonesians conscious of 
their duty towards their people and country and the united nations to fight the 
barbarous invaders and also to plead for close cooperation with the Netherlands 
Indies Government and between all groups of the population. However, the 
communist ex-internees from New Guinea, brought over here by request of the 
allied Commander-in-Chief, have—from what I learned after having established 
contact with the communist party in Australia—grasped the leadership, 
especially of the branches formed in Casino and Sydney. In the central committee
42 Letter from deputy director general of security, K.C. Plumb, N.S.W., Melbourne, to director general of 
security, W. B. Simpson, Canberra, November 9,1944, in AA Canberra A6122/40-136. Citra dan Perjuangan 
Ex Digul, p. 110, mentions Achmad Soemadhi as SIBAR chairman in Mackay.
43 The board in Sydney in April 1945 consisted of Soeparmin, Noerhadi, Soekirno, Doelrachman, and 
Toekliwon, according to a letter from Consul General J. B. D. Pennink to Th. Kist, Sydney, April 24,1945, 
in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30. The background of the five was Pari (2), PKI (2), and unknown (1). 
Citra dan Perjuangan Ex Digul, p. 110, names Soeparmin and Moh. Senan as the Sydney leaders. Together 
they established a trade union for Indonesian seamen. The Sydney branch is also mentioned in a survey of 
SIBAR, certainly by the security service, of September 12,1945, in AA Canberra A6122/40-136. Curiously, 
Penjoeloeh, January 3,1945, reported that no branches yet existed in Australia (in an editorial note 
following "Rapat oemoem 'Sibar' in Merauke").
44 Deputy Director General of Security K. C. Plumb, Canberra, to Director General of Security W. B. 
Simpson, Canberra, December 2,1944, in AA Canberra A 6122/40-136.
45 Pengoeroes Besar Serikat Indonesia Baroe, "Sedikit keterangan tentang 'SIBAR,'" Penjoeloeh, November 8, 
1944. A month later it was reported that permission had yet to be granted ("Soerat Menjoerat," Penjoeloeh, 
December 8,1944).
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the communist Sardjono has become chairman and he has already several times 
had friction with the nationalist other members, because of his acting without 
their knowledge.46
The director general of security, in his advice to Evatt, noted with some anxiety 
that the CPA threatened to infiltrate SIBAR, "in accordance with the usual Communist 
policy of fostering independence movements among native races and of using such 
movements for the advancement of Communist policy." But the answer to Van der 
Plas was a clear one: 'There is no need for any association to obtain permission to 
organize in Australia and unless its activities are such as to bring it within the scope of 
National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations I know of no action which can 
be taken to prevent it from operating."47
Why did Van der Plas wait four months to write this letter, and why didn't he use a 
more informal way to find out what Australians' opinions would be? His many 
contacts would have told him what the legislation on the freedom of association would 
imply. But perhaps he was not altogether unhappy with this moratorium on SIBAR 
activities. He was worried, the letter shows, about communist influence in SIBAR. He 
wrote a letter to Sardjono, probably in the latter part of October 1944, in which he tried 
to find out what Sardjono's, or even the communists', objectives were concerning 
SIBAR.
Sardjono's answer, with some irony and a bit haughty, deserves to be included in 
full.48
Melbourne, 9 November 1944 
Right Honourable Sir,
I sincerely hope that Your Right Honourable did not have to wait too long for my 
answer. I bring the following respectfully to the attention of Your Right 
Honourable. Your question is basically a very simple question. Every communist 
would be able to give it an immediate answer. As, however, it was asked by Your 
Right Honourable I was surprised to no small extent, as Your Right Honourable 
might not be expected to be completely unfamiliar with the party system.
I cannot doubt your trust in me for a single moment, but I suppose that I only 
perceive a certain measure of anxiety on Your part about eventualities, that must 
have been at the basis of your question, all this only being witness of Your 
prudent statesmanship.
46 Letter Ch.O. van der Plas, Brisbane, to H. V. Evatt, minister for external affairs, December 12,1944, in 
Canberra, AA Canberra A989/1-44/ 600/ 5/1/8. The ministry sent a copy for advice to W. B. Simpson, 
director general of security, Canberra, in AA Canberra A6122/40-136. The letter is also found in NA, 
collection Van der Plas, no. 34.
47 Letter from W. B. Simpson, director general of security, Canberra, to the acting secretary, Department of 
External Affairs, Canberra, January 11,1945, in AA Canberra A6122/40-136.
481 have not found the Van der Plas letter. Sardjono's reply, in Dutch, is kept in NA, collection Van der 
Plas, no. 30. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 11C, pp. 146-47, quotes this letter in part. I 
translate Sardjono's letter as accurately as possible, but some of it is unclear, perhaps because of Sardjono's 
lack of Dutch language skills—or could Sardjono's vagueness be intentional?
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A communist, like anyone else who embraces a certain conviction, is governed by 
his political faith. And the communist party, as well as any other party, is the 
embodiment of that conviction.
Now that I am free of any party ties, since the day that I was put in jail to be 
interned, henceforth, according to the all but democratic extraordinary rights, it is 
from then on my political faith that dictates my position. This faith directed me 
inexorably to immediately and wholeheartedly accept the hand, outstretched so 
with such good intentions.
This willingness to cooperate and join with the government to work for a 
Democratic Indonesia underlies my participation in the establishment of SIBAR. 
The aforementioned faith has unequivocally brought me to understand that only 
a Democratic Indonesia will offer SIBAR the opportunity to materialize as a 
party. To live and to die for the sake of Democracy is indeed the common line of 
conduct of all the communists in the world.
There is not any more talk of a command by our international organization, with 
which Your Right Honourable certainly meant to have referred to our Comintern 
[Communist International], Since this organization was dissolved long ago, 
[...] the communists in every country have to fend for themselves.
The only source that obliges us to a serious extent, thus, is our faith, against 
which we can only set our abilities to put it into effect or not.
As to the transformation of SIBAR in our own party, I remark the following. If I 
am able to convert it [to] a communist party, I am certainly also able to establish 
such a party directly. My faith will never induce me to do the first thing.
I hope that in this way I have given the answer Your Right Honourable expected 
to receive.
With my highest respect,
Your most obliging servant,
Sardjono
Three months later Van der Plas gave his analysis of Sardjono's personality. In his 
opinion, Sardjono possessed qualities, but he was a fanatic and a dreamer. In daily 
dealings with the Communist Party in Australia he was definitely dangerous, precisely 
because he was a dreamer.49
PKI, CPA, and SIBAR
Was the cooperation of the PKI exiles with the Dutch a conscious, well-coordinated 
policy mapped out in consultation with the CPA? Rupert Lockwood's Black Armada 
gives an insider's view of CPA-PKI relations. The CPA was active in securing the
49 A letter from Van der Plas to a NICA officer on Morotai, February 13,1945, in De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden, vol. 11C, p. 144.
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release of the exiles, and must soon have discovered how completely uninformed they 
were about world current events. The CPA educated its Indonesian comrades in 
political study groups and language courses. "The knowledge and damage of past 
errors of the PKI" had to be corrected.50 51The CPA was instrumental in "their advance 
from a bottomless marsh of enforced ignorance, sectarian wrangling, and mangled 
lives to an understanding of the new approaches demanded in the era of the second 
world war." It relied on "New PKI intellectuals" who were able to shake off the "old 
reformist and anarchist influences." But it was not easy. "There were numerous 
discussions between CPA and PKI leaders: the Australian advice was delivered in firm 
terms, that support of the war against the Axis was essential, because victory would 
spark anti-colonial revolutions in Asia." Sardjono, although originating from the "Old 
PKI" "had ameliorated his views sufficiently to lead the PKI in Australia, as 
President." The PKI organized secretly in Cowra, and some other branches. Its peculiar 
position as a communist party in the territory of another party was expressed in its 
name as Foreign Section of the PKI operating among the Indonesian People in 
Australia. The PKI was independent, though advised by the CPA, and "at first made 
sectarian errors that made CPA hairs stand on end." Sardjono, according to Lockwood, 
set an example by "donning a Dutch uniform." But the PKI commitment to the Dutch 
was fragile. Lockwood points out that the employment of Indonesian exiles by the 
Dutch also allowed them to read important Allied and Dutch documents, and that this 
information was used appropriately."1
The secret PKI even managed to publish a ten-page mimeographed bulletin, named 
Red Front. The title was in English, but the text was in Indonesian. On the title page the 
bulletin declared itself to be the "Official Voice of the Foreign Section of the PKI." It 
was said by Australian intelligence to have been produced by the CPA in Sydney. The 
third issue, in December 1944, was confiscated by the Dutch or Australian intelligence 
service. It dramatically opened with the words "Don't keep this number! After it has 
been read it must be burnt!" Its contents, however, for the greater part, were 
repetitions of well-known opinions based on the Comintern guidelines advising 
comrades to cooperate with democratic forces against fascism. After the defeat of 
fascism, Indonesia should become completely independent and the structure of 
government should be left to its people. But drama was added in the few pages on the 
PKI in Australia. It emphasized that there was only one PKI, neither an old nor a new 
one. That party was an illegal party, and all members should keep everything secret 
relating to party work. Utmost secrecy, strict discipline, and tight organization were to 
be observed. Without disclosing their PKI background, members should enter other 
organizations and gain influence or control of these. And "Oom" (Uncle) gave some 
practical advice along the lines below:
Going to the pictures, brother? Excellent. Remember! Before you step out of the
door of your room, stop a moment. Have objects or letters that should not be
50 All quotations in this paragraph from Lockwood, Black Armada, pp. 27-38.
51 It is remarkable that Lockwood does not mention SIBAR at all. In 1975, SIBAR probably was considered 
an organization best forgotten. See also De Jong, Het Konirikrijk der Nederlanden, vol. 11C, p. 144. P. Honig, 
in his hearing of May 31,1949, in Enquetecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, vol. 3C, p. 783, describes the 
exiles as smart people, almost all speaking Dutch, who were posted in a great number of offices and who 
must have been struck by the Dutch insincerity about equality between Dutch and Indonesians.
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known by others already been well locked up? Perhaps, later somebody will 
come into your room to ferret about. Such errors are sure to bring danger. 
Remember, our enemies are always watching us!52
In 1947, PKI published in a brochure its view on SIBAR. It was on CPA advice that 
an illegal PKI section was established along with the legally operating SIBAR. Sardjono 
played a key role in both organizations. SIBAR would only cooperate with the Dutch 
as long as the war lasted. Van der Plas failed in his intention to use SIBAR for his own 
purposes. SIBAR was successful in recruiting a considerable number of seamen and 
also won members for the illegal PKI. CPA and SIBAR sacrificed their radical demands 
in favor of a united democratic resistance until the Japanese surrender. Then, at once, 
SIBAR would be dissolved and cooperation with the Dutch would end.53
Uneasy Alliance
On February 7, 1945, the SIBAR Board reported that the Australian government 
had not voiced objections to its proposed activities, and there were no obstacles to 
SIBAR's taking public action.54 The honor of hosting SIBAR's first public meeting fell to 
Merauke, a town never occupied by the Japanese. On December 5, 1944, eighty people 
gathered. Ma'moen undertook the trip together with SIBAR board members 
Almassawa and Moerad. The local SIBAR chairman was Mohamad Djoni, the last one, 
in 1939, to be exiled to Digoel. He was not brought to Australia but left behind in 
Merauke, "as he had many children." The three speakers called upon those present, 
probably of mixed backgrounds and including a few more exiles, to join SIBAR; and 
called for unity and democracy that would, in a new spirit, bring into being a free 
Indonesia, and invited participants to work together with all democratic countries, 
especially the Netherlands. Moerad called on all Indonesians to unite in SIBAR for the 
good of the fatherland.55 567
Maybe Almassawa and Moerad were already in New Guinea. On September 25, 
1944, both were made NIGIS public relations officers, and their new occupation would 
generally involve postings in newly liberated areas.55 On February 1, 1945, two more 
officers were added. And thus Sardjono, as a lieutenant, and Soeka became uniformed 
officers in KNIL, after having sworn their oath of allegiance to the Dutch Queen." 
Sardjono worked for some time on Morotai. His transfer might have suited Van der
52 Red Front is available in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30 (original and translation), and in AA 
Canberra A6122/40-136 (original and translation). The information on its production may be found in 
Van der Plas to Van Mook, Brisbane, April 6,1945, in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30.
53 Rahasin Sibar (Djokjakarta: Bintang Merah, 1947). For a summary, see Harry A. Poeze, Verguisd en 
Vergeten; Tan Malaka, de Linkse Beweging en de Indonesische Revolutie, 1945-1949 (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 
2007), p. 582.
54 "Perkabaran tentang Sibar," Penjoeloeh, February 7,1945.1 have not found Minister Evatt's letter to Van 
der Plas. In "Openbare Vergadering SIBAR," Penjoeloeh, August 13,1945, it is stated that the Dutch 
government's letter, which informed SIBAR about the Australian position, was dated February 13,1945.
55 "Rapat oemoem 'Sibar' di Merauke," Penjoeloeh, January 3,1945. The information on Djoni may be found 
in Citra dan Perjuangan Ex Digul, p. 110.
56 "Angkatan Doea Orang Public Relations Officers Baharoe," Penjoeloeh, October 4,1944.
57 "Public Relations Officer Baroe," Penjoeloeh, February 7,1945.
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Plas and NEFIS as it prevented Sardjono from influencing SIBAR policies.58 According 
to PKI, in 1947 Van der Plas had sent Sardjono to Morotai, as Van der Plas suspected 
him of illegal activities.59
Van der Plas already harbored some reservations concerning Sardjono's role. Van 
der Plas noted the changed course of Penjoeloeh since Boerhanoedin was succeeded by 
Sardjono. The journal created unfavorable impressions and had a "hidden tendency."60 
Around March 1945, Mohamad Bondan joined the editorial staff of Penjoeloeh. Winanta 
was the editor-in-chief and asked Bondan to translate news items and to write articles 
himself. Bondan soon was told that his articles, with criticisms on fascism and 
imperialism, were not appreciated by the head of NIGIS. Bondan resigned, so as not to 
make matters worse for Winanta.61
When Red Front landed on Van der Plas's desk, he contemplated the measures to be 
taken. A re-internment in Digoel was, for practical reasons, not possible. Informing the 
Allies about these secret activities would be useful. Van der Plas saw Sardjono as 
primarily responsible for the anti-Dutch sentiment, and believed action should be 
taken against Sardjono when the opportunity was there.62
Van der Plas also noted with some pleasure that a split had developed among the 
exiles, between nationalists and communists. He referred to the founding of Partai 
Kebangsaan Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) in March 1945 in Mackay. The 
provocative abbreviation of the new party (PKI, the same as for Partai Komoenis 
Indonesia) emphasized its claim to being the rally point of the real Indonesian 
communists—and in this way the bitter feud between Moscow communists and 
national communists under the banner of Tan Malaka was once again ignited. A clear 
foreboding of this was an incident during a SIBAR meeting on February 21,1945, when 
Jahja Nasoetion spoke out against SIBAR views, and was slapped, after which the 
meeting was adjourned in turmoil. On March 15, SIBAR pitted Harjono and Jahja 
Nasoetion against each other in a debate.63
Prominent in the new party were A. J. Patty and Jahja Nasoetion. The program of 
the Parki—as it usually was abbreviated later on—also referred to the Atlantic Charter 
and other Allied declarations about a new democratic world order, one in which 
Indonesia was to be completely independent and would have the sovereignty to
58 Letter from Van der Plas to Van Mook, Brisbane, April 6,1945, in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30.
59 Rahasia SIBAR, p. 32.
60 Memorandum from Van der Plas to Head NIGIS, April 30,1945, in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30.
61 Bondan, Spanning a Revolution, pp. 200-3.
62 Van der Plas to Van Mook, Brisbane, April 6,1945, in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30. In his hearing 
before the inquiry committee, on March 3,1953, Van der Plas referred again to Red Front and to the 
cooperation between the CPA and the exiles, who cooperated with the Dutch to further their own 
objectives. SIBAR is not mentioned, neither by name nor as an unnamed organization (Enquetecommissie 
Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945, vol. 8C-2, pp. 1394—95).
63 H. M., "Tabir Rahasia SIBAR," Murba, April 29 and April 30,1948. On Parki, see Jan Lingard Lingard, 
Refugees and Rebels: Indonesian Exiles in Wartime Australia (North Melbourne: Australian Scholarly 
Publishing, 2008), pp. 106-7; and Poeze, Verguisd en Vergeten, p. 350.
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structure its own state system. No role, however, for the Dutch was foreseen.64 Parki 
attacked SIBAR, and thus PKI, for its cooperation with the Dutch. Both SIBAR and 
Parki tried to obtain some latitude from Dutch Mackay authorities, who, of course, 
favored SIBAR. Parki was smaller than SIBAR, but not as small as a one or two-person 
enterprise. It had at least twenty-two members in Mackay, compared to SIBAR's forty- 
six. Some PKI exiles even proposed to Dutch officials in Mackay that they return the 
Parki board to Digoel, a suggestion that shows how implacably bad relations were.65 In 
public, SIBAR manifested itself in the May 1 parade in Mackay with a decorated truck, 
with banners reading "Smash the Japs first and then towards democratic Indonesia" 
and "'SIBAR/ the new Indonesian League."66
Indicative of the strained relations between the Dutch and the exiles was the 
reaction to the plan of Max Soeprapto and Willi Pande Iroot to publish an "anti-Fascist 
newspaper" in Sydney. Soeprapto and Iroot were arrested, at Dutch instigation, and 
deported to Hollandia, in New Guinea. SIBAR, together with two other organizations 
of Indonesians, protested to Van Mook, and CPA and trade unions followed suit.67
SIBAR's Downfall
According to Penjoeloeh reports, there was not much SIBAR action in the first half of 
1945. On June 24, 1945, a meeting was held in Camp Columbia, Brisbane, with the 
object to establish a SIBAR branch there. Among the two conveners was PKI exile 
Djajadiredja. Harjono, a PNI Baroe exile, and prominent in the PKI after 1945, stressed 
the need to forge an anti-fascist united front. Ma'moen was there, too, and pointed at 
the indispensable Dutch role in creating that solidarity.68
The first anniversary of SIBAR was celebrated in Melbourne and Casino on August 
6, 1945. Maskoen chaired the meeting in Melbourne that opened with "Indonesia 
Raja," the song that embodied the Indonesian national ideals. The first speaker was 
Navy Lieutenant Abdoelrachman, who, at length, sketched the history, objectives, and 
future of SIBAR. He noted SIBAR's six branches—in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, 
Mackay, Casino, and Merauke—and remarked on its almost six hundred members. 
SIBAR's goal was a new democratic Indonesia, not a Japanese or Dutch colony, to be 
achieved by a national front, according to Abdoelrachman. In this, Allied—and 
Dutch—help was necessary, at first to defeat the Japanese. The past should now be 
forgotten. The Dutch had shown their good intentions already by renaming the 
Ministry of Colonies to become the Ministry of Overseas Territories. For SIBAR, it was
64 "Keterangan Pendirian Party Kebangsaan Indonesia (P.K.I.)" and "Urgentie Program," appendix to 
letter from Van der Plas to Assistent-Resident Merauke, April 30,1945, in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 
30.
65 Letter from Van der Plas to Assistent-Resident Merauke, April 30,1945; "Camp Mackay, Kort Verslag 
over de Maand April 1945"; letter from N. S. Blom, director of justice, to minister of Overseas Territories, 
May 14,1945; and "Camp Mackay, Kort Verslag over de Maand Mei 1945," all in NA, collection Van der 
Plas, no. 30.
66 "Camp Mackay, Kort Verslag over de Maand Mei 1945," in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30.
67 Mentioned in a survey of SIBAR, certainly by the security service, of September 12,1945, in AA 
Canberra A6122/ 40-136. See also Lockwood, Black Armada, pp. 71-72; and the CPA journal, Tribune, 
September 24,1945, copied in NA, collection Van der Plas, no. 30.
68 Verslaggever, "Sibar Berkibar di Columbia Camp," Penjoeloeh, July 16,1945.
80 Harry Poeze
important to draft a program on political, economic, and social matters that was to be 
discussed and approved at a SIBAR congress. Then, the program would become the 
subject of discussion with the Dutch. Following Abdoelrachman, Almassawa's speech 
was of a more abstract kind.69 70
In Casino, the festive celebration included music and gamelan, and attracted five 
hundred people. The meeting was arranged by former exiles: Mohammad Toha, 
Ngadiman, Sabariman, and Roekmanda, all of whom had PKI connections.1
At that time, no one present at the celebrations could predict that the war would be 
over in ten days. The expected prolonged struggle with a gradual liberation of 
Indonesia suddenly was not a prospect anymore. And, in the new circumstances, the 
common interest of SIBAR and the Dutch government to cooperate in that struggle 
also evaporated. The center of gravity shifted to Java, where a declaration of 
independence was made on August 17, 1945. But news about that event was still 
ambiguous, and left a lot to be explained, so that any realistic evaluation of its 
consequences was impossible.
In what was probably its last public action, SIBAR sent a telegram to Van Mook: 
"In the name of the Indonesian people we pay respect and wish the best to Your 
Excellency, and we also speak out our endless gratefulness to the Almighty God, as to 
the defeat of Japan and the liberation of Indonesia. May the Almighty God bless all 
Your Excellency's efforts and leadership in relation to the liberation of the New 
Indonesia." Van Mook sent a thank-you telegram in reply and added that he had 
forwarded the SIBAR telegram to Queen Wilhelmina.71
SIBAR's chairman and secretary signed the telegram. Not Sardjono, but Hadji 
Djajaloedin Thaib signed as chairman, along with secretary Almassawa.72 Sardjono had 
already been replaced, but such a move had not been reported in Penjoeloeh. Was it 
because his tasks as a public relations officer prevented him from taking part in 
SIBAR's daily routine? And was this a welcome pretext for pro-Dutch board members 
to oust him? Altogether, information on Sardjono's resignation, separation, or ouster is 
not available, nor is the exact date of the event known.
In 1947, PKI reported that in May 1945 a meeting in Casino had been convened to 
prepare collective action to be implemented as soon as Japan surrendered. Moreover, 
at such time SIBAR was to be dissolved. Sabariman, Ngadiman, Djokosoedjono, 
Harjono, and Achmad Soemadhi were given tasks to execute those plans. After August 
15, 1945, all the branches, indeed, were disbanded, or all members resigned, and the 
Central Board followed suit.73 According to Maskoen, on September 3 he signed a 
statement, on behalf of all branches, that SIBAR ceased to exist, since, as a result of
69 "Openbare Vergadering SIBAR," Penjoeloeh, August 9, August 13, and September 8,1945. The last 
installment ended with "to be continued," but no more issues were published.
70 Pendengar, "Semangat Berkobar: Pemikoel Sendjata dan Keinsjafan," Penjoeloeh, August 20,1945. Citra 
dim Perjuimgim Ex Digul, p. 110, names Toha as the SIBAR leader in Casino.
71 "Oetjapan Terima Kasih," Penjoeloeh, August 23,1945. The dates of the telegrams are not given.
72 Both Thaib and Almassawa were the only two to be nominated to become members of Madjelis Islam 
Tinggi (High Islam Council), instituted as an advisory body by Van Mook on August 21,1945. The 
biography of Thaib mentioned his Digoel exile ("Madjelis Islam Tinggi," Penjoeloeh, September 10,1945).
73 Rahasia SIBAR, pp. 32-33.
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Japan's surrender, SIBAR's objective to support the Allies against Japan had been 
achieved.4
SIBAR's Legacy
The close involvement of the PKI with SIBAR was used by PKI's opponents in the 
internal political struggle of the Republik Indonesia. In the forefront were the "national 
communists," exiled to Digoel for their involvement in Tan Malaka's Partai Republik 
Indonesia, and who organized in Parki in Australia. After their return home in 1946 
they were banned from the reconstituted PKI, whose first chairman was Sardjono—the 
most prominent SIBAR leader. Tan Malaka's followers did not fare well in the 
Republik Indonesia, but found in Sardjono's association with Van der Plas fuel to 
attack "PKI SIBAR," as they called PKI. These attacks were considered so detrimental 
to PKI that its congress in January 1947 decided to publish a brochure, Rahasia SIBAR 
(The secret of SIBAR), serialized first, to counter the slanders by trustworthy 
information. The Congress explicitly approved SIBAR's actions as being in conformity 
with Comintern guidelines and the advice of the CPA.74 5
The case, however, was not closed with Rahasia SIBAR. The subject remained 
sensitive, and made PKI vulnerable. Tan Malaka followers continued to criticize PKI 
for its cooperation with SIBAR. Its daily Murba, published in Surakarta, started a series 
called "Tabir rahasia SIBAR" (The secret of SIBAR revealed) on April 22, 1948, and 
written by "H. M."76 Sixteen installments appeared intermittently until July 31, 1948. 
The series was never published as a brochure, however. The author was well-informed, 
and his partisan interpretations were often backed up by original documents, quoted at 
length, that could not be dismissed by the PKI as slander or forgery. The PKI chose not 
to react at all, considering this strategy the best way to limit damage.77 One last time, in 
1962, Partai Murba, which united radicals inspired by Tan Malaka, and political 
enemies of the PKI, tried to rekindle the feud. In 1962, Soedijono Djojoprajitno, 
prominent in Partai Murba, edited a diverse collection on the subject,78 pleading that 
Tan Malaka made the right political choices, and PKI did not—not in 1926, not in 
Digoel, not in Australia.79
As to SIBAR, the case is closed. The monographs on Indonesian activities in 
Australia do not find SIBAR worth more than an occasional mention, with two
74 Citra dan Perjuangan Ex Digul, p. 112.
75 D. N. Aidit, "Kongres ke-empat," Bintang Merah 2,19 (January 15,1947). The series appeared in Penghela 
Rakjat during April 2-12,1947. The introduction may be found in Rahasia SIBAR, pp. 3-6, and a summary 
may be found in Poeze, Verguisd en Vergeten, pp. 581-82.
76 There is no Pari exile with these initials, so the author is still unknown.
77 H. M., "Tabir Rahasia SIBAR," Murba, serialized from April 22-July 31,1948. The series is summarized 
in Poeze, Verguisd en Vergeten, pp. 725-27.
78 P.K.I.-Sibar contra Tan Malaka; Pemberontakan 1926 & kambing hitam Tan Malaka (PKI Sibar against 
Tan Malaka; The insurrection of 1926 and the scapegoat Tan Malaka).
79 Soedijono Djojoprajitno, P.K.I.-Sibar contra Tan Malaka (Pemberontakan 1926 & "Kambing Hitam" Tan 
Malaka) (Djakarta: Jajasan Massa, 1962), with a contribution by exile Wiro Samiardjo (pp. 72-80) giving 
details on SIBAR. The collection is discussed in Poeze, Verguisd en Vergeten, p. 1761.
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exceptions.80 These publications concentrate on the fate of the Indonesians in Australia, 
who had to wait many months before they could be repatriated, and who mobilized 
support for the new Republik Indonesia. They had a hand in the successful postwar 
boycott of Dutch ships that were to bring men and military and civil supplies to a 
Dutch government in Jakarta that was trying to restore an order in which it would be, 
for the time being, master again.
The protagonists in SIBAR all returned to Indonesia. Sardjono became PKI 
chairman again in 1946 and embodied the continuity between the PKI of 1926 and that 
of 1946. Harjono, sent by NEFIS to be a clerk in Hollandia, made his way back, became 
a PKI member, and chaired the powerful trade-union federation SOBSI. Both men were, 
after the communist insurrection in September 1948, arrested and executed together by 
their countrymen in December 1948. Achmad Soemadhi, a PKI Politburo member in 
1948, survived imprisonment in 1948, and also detention and exile after 1965—one of 
the few PKI members to suffer three times for his convictions. Boerhanoedin's 
Australian career is dazzling. He became the trusted adviser of Van der Plas, who sent 
him for about five months to the Bestuurs Academie in Brisbane, established to 
educate government officials at an advanced level. Hereupon he was chosen to become 
a member of the Dutch delegation to the San Francisco (California) United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, which convened from April 25 until June 26, 
1945. It laid the foundations for the United Nations Organization, inaugurated in 
October 1945. He then went on to the Netherlands and was the first Indonesian from 
the Pacific region to provide Netherlands Indonesians with firsthand accounts about 
developments back home.81 Not much is known about the postwar careers of 
Boerhanoedin and his PNI Baroe comrades. In general, they joined Sjahrir's Partai 
Sosialis, and made a career in party and government. More spectacular was 
Abdoelrachman's career. From being a Dutch naval officer, he became head of 
intelligence of the Republik's Defence Ministry. Poedjosoebroto, too, made a switch 
and became an interpreter with Sjahrir. Djalaloeddin Thaib was in Indonesia after 
August 1945 and still in Dutch service as an Army Ulama, but probably resigned soon 
after, as traces of his life in Dutch archives cease thereafter.82 Almassawa, not a Digoel 
inmate, remained faithful to the Dutch and worked for Dutch radio in Jakarta, 
commenting as Budiman. He wrote regularly in the pro-Dutch journal Pandji Ra'jat 
under the pen name of Atomia, and was later an adviser on Arab affairs.
80 The exceptions are Lingard, Refugees and Rebels, with a subchapter on SIBAR (pp. 104-6); and Citra dan 
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SIBAR: A Footnote in Colonial History?
All parties concerned had reason to forget SIBAR as soon as the war was over. PKI 
and PNI Baroe, reconstituted in the Republik in 1945 as Partai Sosialis, under Sjahrir, 
had ample reason, as affiliation with SIBAR represented an incriminating union with 
the colonial power (notwithstanding how much this alliance had made sense at the 
time, seen from the perspective of the worldwide struggle between Allies and Axis).
As for SIBAR, it looks as if the initiative first was with Van der Plas and Loekman 
Djajadiningrat, who were aware of the necessity to win the hearts of the Indonesian 
people by a policy that radically differed from prewar political immobility. Among the 
Digoel exiles they recruited able Indonesians, first from among the former PNI Baroe, 
supplemented later by PKI members. But what motivated them, or in particular Van 
der Plas, to set up SIBAR? This was to be a party that can only be characterized as an 
official national, even a state party, backed by official support. And Van der Plas 
consciously entered in a close alliance with communists. He must have known that 
they would only act in conformity with the general communist line, in this case, in 
consultation with the comrades in the CPA. Van der Plas's prospects at first were 
bright, but after a short time he lost hold of the reins, and what he did amounted to 
crisis management only. The Indies authorities were wrong in expecting to be able to 
control the communist activities within the limits they would set.
For the PKI, supporting the antifascist struggle bore fruit—PKI gained the 
opportunity to set up an internal communication network, operated by its members in 
Dutch service. In this way, valuable information was gathered. The expertise and 
guidance of the Australian Communist Party were of great importance in this respect. 
Also aided by the sheer number of PKI exiles, PKI became the leading faction among 
the exiles and seamen in Australia. It came to dominate SIBAR, much to the 
authorities' dismay. They had created an organization—SIBAR—that transgressed 
their "official" boundaries. But so as not to lose credibility, they could not take harsh 
measures to force SIBAR to comply with the government's aims. Cautious obstruction 
of PKI influence was thus applied. However, the ideals of SIBAR as an official national 
party, during the first half of 1945, were held aloft by the government, despite the 
communist participation.
For the Dutch, Japan's sudden surrender came, as it did for the Indonesians in 
Australia, as a great surprise. It was probably greeted with great relief by government 
and PKI leaders, as it ended their uneasy alliance in SIBAR. And with the Proclamation 
of Independence, and the support it roused, all postwar plans could be thrown away— 
and the government abandoned SIBAR, too.
A question that cannot be answered is, to what extent was SIBAR an enterprise 
entirely of Van der Plas's making? Nowhere is there mention of Van Mook, head of the 
cabinet in exile, as being informed about SIBAR—and looking at the scope of SIBAR, 
he certainly should have known.
The PKI's junior partnership with the CPA, which was well-informed about 
Moscow's political aims, added to the prestige of PKI exiles when, in March 1946, they 
returned to Indonesia. Their martyr's aureole, moreover, secured them leading 
positions in the reconstituted PKI, which purged communists with "nationalist" 
tendencies.
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An interesting last question concerns whether this Dutch-Communist alliance was 
similar to other Southeast Asian cooperation schemes? These all took a very different 
form. In Vietnam, the US intelligence organization Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
supported Communist leader Ho Chi Minh—who, as such, kept a low profile—in his 
armed resistance against Japan and the pro-Japanese French colonial government. The 
Free French, reinstated in the mother country in 1944, and looking for their return in 
Vietnam, were not pleased. There was no official agreement between OSS and Ho's 
organization, let alone US official recognition.
In the Philippines, the strong Communist-inspired Huk organization fought 
alongside other guerrilla units during the Japanese occupation. But it received 
disproportionately less support, both material and immaterial, than did other anti- 
Japanese guerrilla forces from the pro-US underground network in the Philippines. 
And after the war, with US colonial rule restored, the Huk was cleverly prevented 
from taking a share of power in the independent Philippines, a feat that the US and the 
national elite accomplished.
In Malaya, the case was different again. Anti-Japanese guerrillas, known as the 
Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union, controlled by the Malay Communist Party, an 
almost exclusive ethnic Chinese affair, joined hands with the British equivalent of the 
OSS, the Special Operations Executive (SOE). An agreement was signed in which the 
military cooperation was recorded. Political matters, however, were excluded from it. 
Later efforts by the British Army to come to some agreement on future political terms 
found no conclusion. The reinstatement of British rule after the Japanese surrender 
involved the disarming of the guerrillas—they were unhappy to comply, and 
sabotaged the measures. Soon the war coalition broke up altogether, and before long 
communist-inspired legal and illegal opposition plagued the country, exacerbated by 
race riots between Chinese and Malay.
SIBAR radically differs from the cooperation initiated in other Southeast Asian 
colonies. As for Indonesia, the highest Dutch civil authorities were involved, as were 
legitimate communist leaders; and the agreement—on fundamental issues—was 
officially signed and made public, and was intended to last beyond the Japanese 
surrender.83
The course of history explains why SIBAR was, indeed, relegated to a footnote in 
history, but, in retrospect, it deserves more than the scant attention it has received 
hitherto.
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